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We develop a model of international roaming in which mobile network oper-
ators (MNOs) compete both on the wholesale market to sell roaming services to
foreign operators and on the retail market for subscribers. The operators own
a network infrastructure only in their home country. To allow their subscribers
to place or receive calls abroad, they have to buy roaming services provided by
foreign MNOs. We show that in absence of international alliances and capacity
restrictions, competition between foreign operators would drive wholesale unit
prices down to marginal costs. However, operators prefer to form international
alliances in which members mutually provide roaming services at ine￿ciently high
wholesale prices. Alliances serve as a commitment device to soften competition
on the retail market and harm consumers through excessively high per call prices.
Although operators compete in two-part tari￿s for subscribers, wholesale roaming
prices do not exhibit pro￿t-neutrality as do access prices in related models of net-
work interconnection. We also show that international alliances are endogenously
formed if not prevented by regulation.
Keywords: International roaming, vertical relations, regulation
JEL classi￿cation: D43; L13; L42; L96
1 Introduction
The European market for international roaming accounts for approximately e8.5 billion
or 5.7% of the estimated total mobile industry revenues in 2005 (European Commission,
2006). According to the European Commission the market for international roaming is
highly pro￿table and expected to further grow during the next years. By January 2006,
roaming contributed about 12% to the European mobile industry pro￿ts (European
Commission, 2006, p.78). This paper considers the formation of international alliances
I would like to thank Patrick Rey and Klaus Schmidt for helpful discussions as well as Martin Peitz,
Ray Rees, Monika Schnitzer and John Vickers for useful suggestions. Financial support from the Ger-
man Science Foundation (DFG), the European Network for the Advancement of Behavioral Economics
(ENABLE) and the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) is gratefully acknowledged.
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1as an explanation for high and persistent roaming pro￿ts even though operators compete
on the retail and wholesale level.
International roaming provides subscribers with the possibility to use their mobile
phone outside their own country, where their home network operator has no coverage.
More precisely, international roaming allows subscribers to use the infrastructure of a
visited network in order to make1 and receive calls abroad. In order to provide their
subscribers with this possibility, Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) need to conclude
international roaming agreements with other MNOs in the foreign countries. 2 When a
MNO allows subscribers of a foreign operator to access its network it acts as host opera-
tor. For roaming services, the foreign operators charge wholesale prices to the roaming
subscribers’ home operator which in turn charge retail prices to their subscribers. As
wholesale roaming charges appear as costs for home operators they have a direct im-
pact on the retail prices. Summing up, operators are typically active on two markets:
They o￿er roaming services to foreign operators and buy roaming services abroad on
the wholesale market. In addition, they compete in their home country on the retail
market for subscribers.
In 2006, the European Commission assessed that both the average roaming retail and
wholesale prices were unjusti￿ably high (European Commission, 2006). For example, it
estimated that the per-minute costs (including a margin for ￿xed costs) of an outgoing
roaming call are approximately 20 cents, while the wholesale prices are on average
about 75 cents and retail prices are roughly e1.10 (European Commission, 2006, p.
20). Hence the wholesale prices are estimated to amount roughly 4 times the costs for
originating, transmitting and termination of outgoing roaming calls. This raises the
question why competition has not been e￿ective in the case of roaming.
In this paper we argue that international 3 alliances of MNOs may result in collu-
sively high wholesale prices which would not be sustainable otherwise. Recently, such
alliances have been formed claiming to facilitate the provision of roaming services. 4
A￿liate operators typically agree on special roaming wholesale conditions based on the
promise to direct roaming tra￿c preferably to other alliance members. We show that
because of strategic considerations MNOs prefer to form alliances in order to commit to
procure and to sell roaming services at high prices. Setting high wholesale prices within
an alliance allows to soften competition on the retail market and thereby increases total
pro￿ts.
In our model, in each of two equally sized countries two MNOs compete on the
retail market ￿ la Hotelling for subscribers. 5 We ignore nationwide calls and focus
instead on subscribers’ demand for roaming calls abroad. 6 To provide this service,
1Subscribers can make calls back to their home country, call a local number in the visited country
or call a third country.
2The technical and contractual conditions for concluding and implementing international roam-
ing agreements between GSM operators have been standardized by the GSM Association. See e.g.
Sutherland (2001).
3International alliances are formed by operators which own networks in di￿erent countries
4One example is the Freemove alliance whose web page can be found under http://www.
freemovealliance.com. Interestingly, the European Commission acknowledges the existence of these
alliances but has not pointed out anti-competitive e￿ects.
5Our model is similar to existing models of telecommunication in this respect. See e.g. La￿ont,
Rey, and Tirole (1998a,b)
6Hence in our model MNOs o￿er the single service to their subscribers to place roaming calls once
2each operator needs to access to foreign operators’ infrastructure. Operators may form
international alliances and promise to procure roaming services exclusively from their
partner network. In this case they negotiate jointly on wholesale prices. Operators
may also post wholesale prices and buy roaming services without being a￿liated in an
alliance. They ￿rst set the wholesale roaming prices and decide from which foreign
operator to buy roaming services. Then they o￿er two-part retail tari￿s to potential
subscribers in their home country.
One important peculiarity of roaming compared to models of network-interconnection
is that there is no ￿competitive bottleneck￿ in the sense that no particular foreign op-
erator has to provide the roaming services. 7 Operators may thus freely choose with
which foreign MNO they conclude a roaming agreement. Competition among foreign
operators to act as host operator for a MNO should therefore drive down wholesale
prices for roaming services. However, we show that a preferred alternative is to form
international alliances and to mutually agree on high wholesale roaming prices. Within
an alliance each member acts as home operator for its own subscribers and as host op-
erator for the partner’s foreign subscribers. High wholesale prices are perceived as high
marginal costs and hence render it optimal to set higher retail prices, thereby softening
price competition in the retail market. However, expenses on the wholesale market
are retrieved by providing roaming services to the subscribers of the partner network
as long as the international tra￿c is balanced. In short, as retail prices are strategic
complements when competing for subscribers on the home market, committing to high
retail prices via high wholesale prices allows to raise the equilibrium pro￿ts.
Our ￿ndings are interesting in the light of recent technological developments that
have increased the strategic importance of roaming alliances. Until recently, operators
had limited technical instruments to determine which foreign network their subscribers
would use.8 Subscribers that did not manually register in a particular foreign network
were assigned almost randomly among foreign operators. Having little control over the
foreign network which traveling subscribers would use, operators could hardly commit
to keep the roaming tra￿c within partner networks. In addition, not being able to
direct subscribers to networks that o￿er cheaper roaming services induced MNOs to
charge high wholesale prices.9 By now, technologies have been developed that allow
to direct roaming tra￿c. In 2006, the European Commission estimated that roughly
80% of the roaming tra￿c was already actively directed by the use of these technologies
(European Commission, 2006, p. 24). If operators have the ability to select the host
network they may commit by help of alliances to use the networks of other a￿liated
operators even if these charge higher wholesale prices.
Relative to the existing literature, we ￿nd novel and surprising results. Our model
they are abroad. However, we believe that the issues discussed in this paper are speci￿c to roaming
calls and orthogonal to other services usually o￿ered by MNOs. At the loss of simplicity other services
like nationwide mobile phone calls could be easily integrated.
7In models of interconnected networks subscribers usually become member at one particular network
such that this operator becomes monopolist for the access to this subscriber. The fact that there is ex
ante competition for subscribers but an de-facto monopoly of access ex post is denoted as ￿competitive
bottleneck￿. See e.g. Armstrong (2002); Armstrong and Wright (2007)
8For an detailed technical description, see e.g. Stumpf (2001), Salsas and Koboldt (2004) or Euro-
pean Commission (2005).
9We show in section 7, that in the absence of control regarding the host network the wholesale
prices may even exceed the monopoly level.
3exhibits what Carter and Wright (1994) call symbiotic production : Each operator o￿ers
roaming services as intermediate products to foreign operators, and resells roaming
services from foreign operators to own subscribers. Similar to Carter and Wright (1994)
but unlike the models of national telecommunication, 10 operators of di￿erent countries
do not compete for the same subscribers. Carter and Wright (1994) assume that there
is only one operator in each country and ￿nd that double marginalization leads to
ine￿ciently high retail prices. They conclude that both operators and consumers would
be better o￿ if operators cooperated and bilaterally reduced their wholesale prices. In
contrast, we show that this argument does not apply when there is competition both
on the retail and intermediate product markets. In absence of alliances, competition
between foreign operators drives down wholesale prices and competition in two-part
tari￿s on the home market induces operators to avoid dead-weight losses by o￿ering
calls at perceived marginal costs and assure pro￿ts via a ￿xed payment. Hence in our
model, subscribers could place roaming calls at an e￿cient price level if international
alliances were forbidden.
The role of the wholesale roaming prices in our setup is similar to that of the
access prices in the two-way network interconnection model of La￿ont, Rey, and Tirole
(1998a). They ￿nd that higher access prices may soften competition and produce higher
equilibrium prices if network operators compete on the retail market in linear prices.
However, they also show that if operators compete in two-part tari￿s, the collusive
power of access prices vanishes. In contrast, we ￿nd that higher wholesale prices allow
to raise pro￿ts even though ￿rms compete in two-part tari￿s on their home market.
In the roaming market, directly competing operators of one country cannot soften
competition simultaneously as they need access to foreign infrastructure. Therefore, if
one operator enters into an international alliance and agrees on high wholesale roaming
prices, the competitor’s perceived costs for roaming services remain unchanged. In
contrast to La￿ont, Rey, and Tirole (1998a), our line of reasoning relies on strategic
complementarity of retail tari￿s: If one operator commits to higher wholesale prices, it
optimally o￿ers less favorable contracts to subscribers. The domestic competitor reacts
by o￿ering also less attractive tari￿s and due to softer competition, both operators’
pro￿ts increase. This might explain why domestic competitors did rarely complain
when international alliances were formed.
There are also conceptual similarities to the literature of vertical relationships. 11 In
particular, Sha￿er (1991) shows that downstream ￿rms might prefer to pay higher unit
prices for intermediate goods and receive a ￿xed compensation instead of low unit prices
if this serves as a commitment device to soften downstream competition. Similarly, in
our model, operators prefer to commit to high wholesale price to soften competition.
However, our reasoning does not rely on ￿xed payments to compensate higher unit
prices since operators mutually provide roaming services in an alliance. In addition,
the existing literature has analyzed competition in linear prices on the downstream
market so far. To our knowledge, we are the ￿rst who show that operators may also
exploit strategic complementarity even though competing in nonlinear prices in the
downstream market.
Recently, a small literature that also analyzes the international roaming market
10see e.g. Armstrong (2002) for an overview.
11See e.g. Bonanno and Vickers (1988), Sha￿er (1991) and Rey and Stiglitz (1995).
4emerged. Salsas and Koboldt (2004) as well as Lupi and Manenti (2006, 2008) also
consider a setup of two operators in each of two countries. 12 However, Salsas and
Koboldt (2004) do not explicitly take into account that each operator is active both on
the wholesale market and on the retail market and therefore do not consider the pos-
sibility of international alliances. Another di￿erence of their base setup to our model
is their assumption that roaming tra￿c cannot be directed to a particular foreign net-
work. They ￿nd that if roaming tra￿c is allocated randomly across foreign networks,
the resulting wholesale price even exceeds that of a monopolist. 13 Compared to Salsas
and Koboldt (2004), our contribution is to show that it may be advantageous to recip-
rocally commit to direct roaming tra￿c to a partner network. Lupi and Manenti (2006,
2008) assume that operators act as local monopolists on the retail market. Therefore,
they do not analyze operators’ incentives to set high wholesale prices in order to soften
retail competition. In their setup, alliances optimally set wholesale prices at marginal
costs, which is not in line with the current evidence. 14 In contrast to Lupi and Manenti
(2008), in our model alliances arise endogenously.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we formally
introduce our basic model where alliances are exogenously given. Section 3 characterizes
the equilibrium retail tari￿s for given wholesale prices. In section 4 we show that
wholesale prices would be set equal to marginal costs in the absence of international
alliances. Section 5 considers the case where all operators have formed competing
international alliances and shows that operators set ine￿ciently high wholesale prices.
Section 6 extends our basic model by adding a ￿rst stage in which alliances can be
formed. As a result two competing alliances may emerge endogenously in absence of
regulatory constraints. In section 7 we formally derive that recent improvements in
the technology of network selection have augmented the role of international alliances.
Section 8 o￿ers various extensions that mainly serve as robustness checks before we
conclude in section 9.
2 The Model
There are two countries A and B as well as two MNOs with index 0 and 1 in each
country. Operator xi is active in home country x 2 fA;Bg and has position i 2
f0;1g. We assume that each operator’s network covers only its home country. Every
operator participates in two related markets: Firstly, each operator competes with its
domestic competitor on the retail market for subscribers which live in the operator’s
home country. Secondly, in the wholesale market each operator o￿ers roaming services
to foreign operators and buys these services in order to resell them to own subscribers.
These wholesale agreements are thus established between two operators of di￿erent
nationality.
Cost structure: Each of the four operators incurs the same marginal cost c  0
when a subscriber places a roaming call. This marginal cost includes origination, trans-
12Tsyganok (2008) also analyzes international roaming.
13In an extension, Salsas and Koboldt (2004) assume that tra￿c can be (partially) directed to the
cheapest foreign operator and they ￿nd that this assumption drives wholesale prices down.
14Lupi and Manenti (2008) also analyze wholesale prices that arise in case operators may grant
loyalty discounts if all adressable tra￿c is directed to the same visited network. They ￿nd that loyalty
discounts may leed to high wholesale prices.
5fer and termination. For simplicity, we assume that all roaming calls are terminated at
some third party ￿xed network so that we can abstract from tra￿c generated by the
termination of roaming calls. In addition, operators have to incur monthly ￿xed costs
CF per subscriber, e.g. for billing.
Retail pricing structure: We focus on outgoing roaming calls that subscribers
may place while traveling abroad and assume that it is the only service which MNOs
o￿er to their subscribers. In particular, we abstract from nationwide calls. 15 Operators
o￿er a two-part tari￿: Operator xi charges a usage price pxi 2 R per roaming call from
abroad and a (monthly) ￿xed fee Fxi 2 R. When a consumer places q roaming calls,
she has to pay in total pxiq + Fxi.
Retail demand structure: As in La￿ont, Rey, and Tirole (1998a), networks are
di￿erentiated ￿ la Hotelling. In each country, consumers are uniformly located on
the segment [0;1]. The operators are located at the two extremities and the index
i 2 f0;1g also indicates their position. Each consumer may join at most one network.
Being connected to any network generates a ￿xed surplus v0.16 Placing roaming calls
generates a gross surplus u(q). Consumers have quasilinear preferences in wealth such
that the (incremental) utility of a consumer with taste l who joins operator xi and




ji   lj + u(q)   pxiq   Fxi + v0
The term   1
2ji   lj expresses the loss of utility in case the joined network does
not correspond exactly to the consumers taste where  > 0 parameterizes the degree
of taste di￿erentiation. A consumer that does not join either network receives utility
that is normalized to 0. For technical convenience, we assume that joining a network
is su￿enciently attractive (i.e. v0 is high enough) so that all subscribers join a network
on the relevant range of prices. 17 Preferences are the same in both countries. Note that
consumers care only about their domestic operator, not about which foreign operator
handles their roaming calls.18
The optimal individual demand and the resulting consumers’ value from roaming
calls are de￿ned as follows:
q(p)  argmax
q fu(q)   pqg
v(p)  u(q(p))   pq(p)
15Further services such as nationwide calls could be included in the model at the cost of tractability.
Due to competition in two part tari￿s, usage prices would be set equal to perceived marginal costs.
See also footnote 16 below.
16While we use v0 to assure that the market is covered, this term may represent the net surplus
generated by services other than roaming which we do not model explicitely.
17This assumption is commonly made the literature of network interconnection. See e.g. La￿ont,
Rey, and Tirole (1998a, p. 7) for further discussion.
18The assumption that consumers do not care which foreign network provides the roaming services
can be justi￿ed in several ways. One plausible reasoning relies on a heterogenous coverage. While a
subscriber usually lives and works at a priori known places, she prefers to join a network that o￿ers
good coverage at these focal points. However, when signing a mobile phone contract, a subscriber is
usually less aware of the foreign places where she will use roaming services.
6Since subscribers have quasilinear preferences concerning wealth, the value function
v : R ! V 19 satis￿es the envelope condition v0(p) =  q(p). We maintain the following
mild assumption throughout the paper: 20
Assumption 1 Per customer demand q(p) is non-negative, continuously di￿erentiable
and non-increasing on R: q() 2 R+; q0()  0. Subscribers have a strictly positive
demand for roaming services at the true marginal cost: q(c) > 0.
For future reference we de￿ne the net surplus of a tari￿ as
w(p;F)  v(p)   F (1)
Economically, the net surplus indicates how much of the value v(p) created by placing
roaming calls retains with the subscriber.
If the di￿erence between the net surpluses o￿ered by competing retail contracts in
country x is not too large (jwxi   wxjj < 1
2), both operators achieve a strictly positive
market share.21 The market share nxi of operator i in country x is then:
nxi = n(wxi;wxj) 
1
2
+  (wxi   wxj) (2)
If instead operator i o￿ers a contract that is far more attractive than its competitor’s
tari￿ (wxi  wxj + 1
2), then it corners the whole market.
Wholesale prices: As each operator’s infrastructure only covers its home country,
its subscribers have to be hosted by another operator while traveling abroad. We assume
that the home operator is able to determine on which network its subscribers register
once they are abroad, since roughly 80% of the roaming tra￿c was indeed directed to
the desired foreign network by 2006. For each roaming call, the host operator bills the
wholesale price ayj to the subscriber’s home operator. 22 So the host operator’s pro￿t
on one roaming call is ayj   c.
International alliances: Mobile operators may also form international alliances.
Within an alliance, the operators negotiate on a wholesale price at which they mutually
provide roaming services. Alliance members commit to direct their subscribers to the
partner network abroad. It will become clear that the appeal of alliances lies precisely in
the commitment that the subscribers are possibly not hosted by the cheapest operator
19De￿ne V  f~ vj9p 2 R s.t. ~ v = v(p)g as the set of values that can be possibly achieved.
20This assumption essentially imposes restrictions on u(). We state this assumption directly on q()
for notational convenience.
21See e.g. La￿ont, Rey, and Tirole (1998a).
22Under the rules of the GSM Association, when a roaming subscriber uses the services of a visited
network, the roaming subscriber’s home network is responsible for payment of all charges incurred for
services used in accordance with the published Inter-Operator-Tari￿s (IOT) of the visited network.
The introduction of the IOT in 1998 dissociated wholesale roaming prices from the standard retail tari￿s
applied by the visited network. Thus, the competitive conditions prevailing on the retail market were
no longer re￿ected on the wholesale market for international roaming. Prior to 1998, wholesale roaming
charges were calculated on the basis of the so-called Normal Network Tari￿ (NNT) of a visited MNO.
The NNT was based on the standard user tari￿ charged by MNOs at the retail level. In 1995 visited
MNOs started charging foreign MNOs a multiplier up to a maximum of 1.15 to the NNT. This cap was
supposed to re￿ect subscription charges that would otherwise have not been re￿ected in the wholesale
roaming charges for outgoing calls. See also http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?
reference=MEMO/05/44&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en .













Figure 1: Model Setup - Overview
abroad. After a wholesale price has been negotiated, it becomes public knowledge.
This assumption re￿ects that the wholesale prices, which are also called Inter-Operator-
Tari￿s, are published by the GSM Association. Internatioal alliances can be formed
only between operators from di￿erent home countries. 23
Figure 1 summarizes the structure of the model. It shows the equilibrium con￿g-
uration of two competing alliances. In this ￿gure, MNOs with the same index form
alliances. The dashed line illustrates the possibility to o￿er roaming services to foreign
operators that are outside of an alliance.
Timing: The base model consists of the following stages:
1. Members of an alliance negotiate wholesale prices for roaming calls within the
alliance.
2. MNOs simultaneously set wholesale roaming prices for operators that are not
a￿liated with an alliance.
3. Operators set retail tari￿s.
4. Consumers subscribe to their preferred network and place their calls.
The sequential structure allows MNOs to set their wholesale prices strategically. It
re￿ects that due to legal and practical reasons, wholesale prices can be changed less
easily than retail tari￿s.24 The model is solved by backward induction.
23We suspect that domestic regulation agencies would prohibit alliances that would involve of more
than one MNO of a coutry. Members of these alliances could then collude on their domestic retail
prices as well, thereby weakening competition.
24In Europe, the Standard Terms for International Roaming Agreement (STIRA) issued by the GSM
Association provide guidelines how wholesale prices have to be set. They prescribe that wholesale prices
have a validity of at least six months.
83 Retail tari￿s and market share
In this section we take as given the choice of the foreign host operator which provides
its network for the visiting subscribers abroad and characterize the equilibrium retail
tari￿s, market shares, and the operators’ retail pro￿ts.
Perceived marginal costs of roaming services: The marginal cost of the re-
selling operator xi, which we denote as cxi, equal the wholesale price of its host oper-
ator. For example, if operator Ai o￿ers to its subscribers roaming services in country
B which are provided by operator Bj then the perceived marginal costs of operator Ai
are cAi = aBj.
Since we assume that both competing operators in one country set their prices si-
multaneously, the optimal retail tari￿ maximizes each operator’s retail pro￿t for a given
tari￿ of the domestic competitor. Per subscriber, an operator earns (pxi   cxi)q(pxi) +
Fxi   CF. The retail equilibrium tari￿ can be more easily derived by solving for the
optimal retail per call price and the optimal net surplus (pxi;wxi) instead of the opti-
mal ￿xed fee.25 When charging the per call price pxi, o￿ering the net surplus wxi and
incurring the perceived marginal cost of cxi; an operator earns the following retail pro￿t
per customer

R(pxi;wxi;cxi)  q(pxi)(pxi   cxi) + v(pxi)   wxi   CF (3)
The retail pro￿ts R






Thus the retail pro￿t (4) of operator xi depends only on the net surplus of its
competitor’s tari￿, not on its competitor’s retail per call price.
Since the per call price does not enter the market share, the usage price is chosen
solely as to maximize the per customer pro￿t (3). The availability of two-part retail
tari￿s renders it optimal to set the per call price equal to perceived marginal costs, that
is p
xi = cxi.26 Intuitively, when the usage price equals the perceived marginal costs,
any dead-weight loss (from the viewpoint of the reselling operator) is avoided and the
surplus is maximized since q(pxi)(pxi   cxi) + v(pxi)  v(cxi).27 The di￿erence between
the maximal surplus v(cxi) and the desired net surplus wxi is then transferred between
the subscriber and the operator via the implicitly determined ￿xed fee without causing
any ine￿ciencies. The maximal per customer retail pro￿t is

R(wxi;cxi) = v(cxi)   wxi   CF (5)
The optimal level of net surplus can be determined explicitely by use of the corre-
sponding ￿rst order condition as follows:
25Since the ￿xed fee depends linearly on the net surplus, it can be easily retrieved using the identity
Fxi = v(pxi)   wxi.
26This ￿nding is by now well understood. See e.g. La￿ont, Rey, and Tirole (1998a); Armstrong




(cxi) = 0, then p
xi = cxi is not a strict maximizer of R(pxi;axi;cxi), and its maximum is
also attained by other per call prices. However, this does neither change retail pro￿ts nor the best
response of the retail competitor. As all retail per call prices that attain the maximum retail pro￿ts









The following Lemma characterizes the retail equilibrium:
Lemma 1 A retail equilibrium always exists. If the di￿erence between perceived marginal
costs is not too big, namely jv(cx0)   v(cx1)j  3
2, the retail equilibrium is uniquely
characterized by (7)-(9). If instead v(cxi) v(cxj) > 3
2, then there exists a unique equi-
librium in weakly undominated strategies 28 where operator xi serves the whole market
and o￿ers w
xi = 1
2 + v(cxj)   CF, while its competitor sets w
xj = v(cxj)   CF.
Proof. Suppose that jv(cxi)   v(cxj)j < 3
2. We ￿rst show that (6) indeed max-




R(pxi;wxi;cxi)   R(cxi;wxi;cxi) = nxi
R pxi
cxi q
0(p)(p   cxi)dp  0 with strict inequal-
ity whenever nxi > 0 and q(cxi) 6= q(pxi). Thus p
xi = cxi maximizes R
xi inde-
pendently of wxi and wxj. We have @R
@wxi(cxi;wxi;w
xj;cxi) = 2 (w











Solving simultaneously the reaction functions (6) for both operators yields the equa-
tions below. Being a system of linear equations, the solution is unique. The condition
jv(cxi)   v(cxj)j < 3
2 assures that the market share stays between zero and one.
The case jv(cxi)   v(cxj)j  3


























The previous characterization of the retail equilibrium o￿ers two interesting in-
sights. Firstly, equation (8) con￿rms the intuition that MNOs with a lower perceived
marginal cost than their domestic competitor will also achieve a bigger market share
in equilibrium. The equilibrium market share depends only on the di￿erence in sur-
plus v(cxi)   v(cxj) that both operators generate on the retail level using optimal per
call prices. Since the optimal per customer pro￿ts increase in the market share, the
di￿erence in equilibrium net surplus wxi   wxj is only one third of the di￿erence in
surplus.
Secondly, equation (9) shows that the retail pro￿ts depend on the perceived marginal
costs only through the equilibrium share. If wholesale roaming prices of both competi-
tors in one country are reduced such that the market share is left unchanged, then the
28See Palfrey and Srivastava (1991) for a de￿nition of the undominated Nash Equilibrium concept.
An undominated NE may not consist of strategies that are weakly dominated. A strategy is weakly
dominated if there exists another strategy that yields for any strategy of the remaining agents at least
the same payo￿ as the dominated one, and yields a strictly higher payo￿ for at least one strategy of
the remaining agents.
10retail pro￿ts also stay constant. Any surplus gains are passed on to the customers.
Thus, concerning the retail pro￿ts, operators are indi￿erent against a rise of both com-
petitors’ perceived marginal costs that leaves the market share unchanged. This pro￿t
neutrality is reminiscent of results found by La￿ont, Rey, and Tirole (1998a). 29
However, an increase of the perceived marginal cost of operator xi while holding















By the envelope theorem, changes of the own retail tari￿ which are caused by an increase
in the perceived per call cost have no marginal e￿ects on retail pro￿ts. Consequently,
in case both operators have a strictly positive market share, an increase in the own
perceived marginal cost (10) a￿ects the retail pro￿t through two channels. Firstly, a
higher per call cost directly decreases the retail pro￿t by  n
xiq(cxi). However, the
loss from a higher perceived marginal cost is partially compensated by softer competi-
tion on the retail market. Competitor xj anticipates that operator xi passes a higher
wholesale price on to the customers and optimally decreases its own net surplus by
dwxj
dcxi =  1
3q(cxi). This increases the retail pro￿t of operator xi by 1
3n
xiq(cxi). Taken
together, the negative marginal e￿ect of an increase in the perceived cost outweighs the
positive e￿ect of softer competition. So each operator prefers to pay as low wholesale
prices as possible.
According to equation (11), operator xi bene￿ts from an increase in the perceived
marginal cost of its domestic competitor xj. By (6), an increase in cxj induces operator
xj to o￿er less attractive retail tari￿s. This in turn increases operator xi’s market share
and thereby leads to an increase in pro￿ts.
Lemma 1 also describes the theoretical possibility of a corner equilibrium if the
di￿erence in perceived per call costs is too big. As long as the competitor stays out of
the market, a marginal increase in own per call costs triggers no strategic e￿ect of softer
competition. So there remains solely the direct negative e￿ect of a higher perceived
cost.
4 Wholesale prices without international alliances
In this section, which serves as a benchmark, we assume that operators compete in a
standard Bertrand way to serve as host operator. Operators cannot commit to channel
their roaming tra￿c to a particular network.
In stage 1 each operator xi o￿ers (simultaneous with its domestic competitor xj) to
act as host operator for subscribers of country y at the wholesale price axi. For simplicity
we assume that each operator then selects one foreign operator that subsequently serves
as host operator for roaming calls from abroad.
29La￿ont, Rey, and Tirole (1998a) analyze the e￿ect of two-part tari￿s in section 8. They also ￿nd
that increase of perceived marginal costs that leaves the equilibrium market shares unchanged has no
e￿ect on equilibrium retail pro￿ts. This result hinges on the fact that @n(wx)=@wi is constant.
11In case the foreign operator yj selects operator xi as host operator, from section (2),
the latter earns nyjq(axi)[axi   c] from roaming subscribers of operator yj. As shown
in the previous section, it is optimal for any operator of country y to buy roaming
services from the foreign operator which o￿ers the lowest wholesale price. 30 Therefore
any operator optimally undercuts the o￿ered wholesale prices of its domestic competitor
as long as the margin axi   c is strictly positive. By the usual Bertrand resonsing, any
operator o￿ers roaming services at wholesale price axi = c in equilibrium. The following
conclusion summarizes the resulting equilibrium wholesale prices:
Lemma 2 If international alliances are not feasible, in equilibrium the wholesale price
equals the real cost of providing a roaming call c.
Proof. In the text.
5 Wholesale prices under international alliances
In this section we take the following bilateral cooperations as exogenously given: oper-
ator A0 collaborates with B0 and A1 forms an international alliance with B1. More
precisely, Ai is host operator for the subscribers of Bi and conversely Bi is host opera-
tor for subscribers of Ai. The most important characteristic of this alliance is that both
members commit to buy roaming services only from the foreign partner network, even
in case another foreign operator o￿ers cheaper wholesale prices for roaming services.
We assume that members of an alliance set wholesale prices cooperatively to max-
imize joint pro￿ts. For simplicity, we impose that both partners must agree on one
wholesale price that applies for roaming calls in both directions: aAi = aBi  ai.31 We
later consider richer sets of agreements in section 8.2.
The negotiated wholesale prices are public knowledge. Hence the ensuing retail
equilibrium tari￿s are as described in section 3, treating the own wholesale price as a
perceived marginal cost: cxi = ai. In particular, operators anticipate the strategic e￿ect
on their domestic competitors’ retail tari￿s.
Operator xi’s overall pro￿t comes from reselling roaming calls to subscribers in its
home country x and from selling roaming services to operator yi. Due to reciprocal
wholesale prices, symmetric costs and demand across countries all members of one
alliance receive equal market shares n
Ai = n
Bi  n




i . Therefore, the total pro￿ts of alliance i’s members are as follows:










W(ai)  q(ai)[ai   c]
is the per customer wholesale pro￿t of operator xi.
30Note that in case each operator applies the optimal retail tari￿s as determined in section (3) and
would o￿er subscribers to choose among foreign operators, then it would be also optimal for subscribers
to choose the cheapest foreign network.
31Due to our symmetry assumptions, both members of an alliance have identical preferences on the
wholesale price axi: Assuming symmetric bargaining power, they would deliberately choose aAi = aBi
even if they were allowed to set possibly di￿ering wholesale prices (aAi;aBi).
12The following Lemma establishes that cornered-market con￿gurations cannot be an
equilibrium:
Lemma 3 In any equilibrium in weakly undominated strategies 32 both alliances have a




We prove that any such equilibrium would entail wholesale prices not lower than
marginal costs. In addition, a corner equilibrium would necessarily involve one alliance
that sets high wholesale prices, therefore attracts no customers and consequently earns
zero pro￿ts. But then it would be a better strategy to match the competing alliance’s
wholesale price, which guarantees positive retail and nonnegative wholesale pro￿ts.
Hence no alliance will ever set a wholesale price that leads to its exclusion from the
market.
Since in any equilibrium both operators will achieve a positive market share, we
focus on interior equilibria, i.e. on wholesale prices that lead to a shared retail market
(i.e.jv(a0)   v(a1)j < 3
2) in the further presentation. Building on the results of sec-





















q(p) is the markup elasticity of per customer demand. 33
If the retail equilibrium tari￿s were not a￿ected by a change of the wholesale price,
an increase of the wholesale pro￿t, that would be achieved by raising the wholesale
price would be completely o￿set by a reduction of the retail pro￿t. However, there
arise indirect e￿ects because a change of the wholesale price also a￿ects the retail
tari￿s.
Once the wholesale price has been ￿xed within an alliance, each member chooses
the tari￿ that maximizes its retail pro￿ts, not taking into account the e￿ects on the
wholesale pro￿ts that foreign members of the alliance earn by providing roaming ser-
vices. In particular, by section 3, the wholesale price will be passed on to customers
directly. The indirect e￿ect of a marginal increase in ai through the usage price on
the per customer wholesale pro￿t is (ai   c)q0(ai).34 In addition, the retail equilibrium
net surplus w
i depends on the value v(ai) implied by the wholesale price. Therefore,
32This re￿nement is needed to rule out unplausible equilibria in case case demand is constant below







j) < v(c)   3
2. Clearly, n(a
i;a










. In addition, any deviation of alliance j yields at most pro￿ts 0. In the
deviation price is ^ aj such that v(^ aj) > v(a
i)   3
2 so that alliance j achieves a positive share, then
(^ aj;a







 + W(^ aj)
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 . This class
of equilibria is unplausible since it requires operator i to use a weakly dominated strategy on R and
operator j to use a weakly dominated strategy on aj 2 ( 1;0].
33Note that the demand elasticity in markup terms is closely connected to the price elasticity of
demand which is de￿ned as (p) 
 pq
0(p)
q(p) . The following relationship holds: (p) = (p)
(p c)
p < (p).
In case of c = 0, the markup elasticity coincides with the price elasticity of per customer demand.
34Similar to section 3, while the envelope theorem states that an increase in the retail per call price
has no marginal e￿ect on retail pro￿ts, it has a negative e￿ect on wholesale pro￿ts.








There is also a strategic e￿ect since the domestic competitor in the retail market
observes the negotiated wholesale prices. It reacts on higher wholesale prices by o￿ering
itself less attractive tari￿s as explained in section 3. Inducing softer competition renders
increasing wholesale prices attractive from the viewpoint of an alliance. The marginal
pro￿t due to softer competition is 1
3q(ai)R
i .
The following mild technical assumption su￿ces to guarantee existence and unique-
ness:
Assumption 2 The markup elasticity of per customer demand (p) is non-decreasing
for all prices above marginal costs whenever (p)  1.
Assumption 2 is satis￿ed by many commonly used demand functions, including
constant demand, linear demand or constant (price) elasticity demand. 35
Analyzing the marginal pro￿t (13) allows to restrict the relevant range of candidate
equilibrium wholesale prices as follows:
Lemma 4 In any interior equilibrium, the wholesale price a
i
i) never lies below the marginal costs: a
i  c,
ii) is low enough to ensure positive per customer demand: q(a
i) > 0,
iii) ensures that the per customer demand markup-elasticity is low: (a
i) < 1
3,
iv) is low enough to satisfy v(c) < v(a
i) + 3
2 if Assumption 2 holds.
Proof. See appendix.
Lemma 4 summarizes some intuitive and economically important insights. The ￿rst
part states that in any equilibrium an alliance will never set wholesale prices below
the marginal cost for two reasons: Firstly, a low wholesale price fuels competition on
the retail market. Secondly, wholesale prices below costs induce subscribers to place
calls ine￿ciently often and losses on the wholesale level are even aggravated by an
ine￿ciently high market share. Thus, setting the wholesale price equal to marginal
cost clearly dominates prices below marginal costs.
Part ii) states that alliances never set the wholesale price so high that roaming
demand is completely choked o￿. Given that the rival alliance charges a wholesale
price that covers at least its marginal costs, by setting the own wholesale price equal to
marginal costs, an alliance could increase its retail pro￿ts while maintaining a wholesale
pro￿t of zero.
Part iii) of Lemma 4 states that alliances always operate at wholesale prices where
demand is quite inelastic with respect to the markup. Equation (13) directly reveals
that if (ai) > 1
3, the adverse e￿ect of increasing the dead-weight loss would dominate
the gains from softer competition. 36
35Examples are constant demand q(p) = q 8p, constant elasticity demand q(p) = ap  a; > 0,
or demand of the form q(p) = maxfa   bp;0g with a;b; > 0 .
36It is interesting to compare this insight with standard results from one-stage models of oligopolistic
consumer choice models where ￿rms compete in linear prices such as Anderson, de Palma, and Nesterov
(1995). In their model, ￿rms set prices such that (ai) < 1, hence potentially operate in slightly more
elastic regions. This comes from the fact, that in their model, an increase in the price really increases
the markup, while in our model it only leads to gains via softening the competition.
14The most surprising result of Lemma 4 is its last part. It is never optimal to
choose a wholesale price that would excessively reduce the value v(ai), compared to
that generated by a usage price that equals the true marginal costs, v(c). Intuitively,
setting a high wholesale price means that the wholesale pro￿ts per customer are high.
But then it would be more pro￿table to marginally decrease the wholesale price in order
to expand the market share. This result has an important implication for equilibrium
existence: As the equilibrium prices are not too far away from the marginal costs,
deviating from any equilibrium by setting the wholesale price equal to marginal costs
does not su￿ce to corner the market. Deviations that allow to corner the market thus
require prices below the true marginal costs and are therefore less attractive than smaller
deviations. Thus, in contrast to La￿ont, Rey, and Tirole (1998a), local equilibria are
always robust to big deviations if Assumption 2 holds.
For future reference, we de￿ne E as the relevant set of wholesale prices that poten-
tially might be chosen in equilibrium according to Lemma 4. 37 Assumptions 1 and 2 on
customer demand guarantee that E is an interval nonempty38 with lowest element c.






















i is the price elasticity of the equilibrium retail market share. In a symmetric
equilibrium, each alliance achieves a market share of n
i = 1
2 and the price elasticity of
the market share simpli￿es to n(ai)  2
3aiq(ai). We now state our main result:
Proposition 5 The wholesale prices of any interior equilibrium are characterized by
equation (14) and are strictly above marginal costs: a
i > c. If Assumption 2 holds,
then a symmetric equilibrium exists with both alliances setting the wholesale price a
0 =
a
1 = a. This unique interior equilibrium entails an equilibrium per customer wholesale
pro￿t of W =
1 3(a)
2 .
Proof. See the appendix.
Besides existence and uniqueness, proposition 5 con￿rms that alliances will set
higher wholesale prices for roaming calls than would be socially optimal. Assumption 2
assures existence and uniqueness but is not needed to derive that a strictly positive
markup on the wholesale level necessarily occurs.
The intuition of this proposition is as follows: By setting high wholesale prices,
operators credibly commit to o￿er less attractive retail tari￿s and thereby soften com-
petition on the retail price setting stage. Accepting a high unilateral wholesale price
for own customers would not be pro￿table as shown in section 4. However, setting
high wholesale prices bilaterally in an alliance is attractive: Within an international
alliance, each operator acts as host operator and fully bene￿ts from high wholesale
prices by providing roaming calls for the foreign operator’s subscribers. After wholesale
37Formally, E =

p 2 Rj(p) < 1
3 ^ p  c ^ q(p) > 0 ^ v(p) > v(c)   3
2
	
38Since we assume that the per customer demand is continuously di￿erentiable on R and therefore
bounded around c and that q(c) > 0, the markup elasticity (p) approaches zero for wholesale prices
close to c.
15prices have been set in an alliance, an operator cannot a￿ect the retail market share of
members in the foreign country any more. Hence wholesale pro￿ts will not a￿ect the
decision of the own retail tari￿ for domestic subscribers. However, being committed
to pay high wholesale prices when buying roaming services for own subscribers softens
competition on the home retail market.
Looking at the marginal e￿ects of an increase in wholesale prices when they are
close to marginal costs is helpful to understand why there is always a positive wholesale
markup in equilibrium. Evaluating (13) at ai = c, yields
@i
@ai (c;aj) = 1
3n
iq(c) > 0 and
illustrates that there is a positive ￿rst-order e￿ect on the joint pro￿t of an alliance .
In contrast, losses caused by the operators from not taking into account the wholesale
pro￿ts when setting retail prices are of second-order at ai = c. The reason is that when
the wholesale markup is small, so is the indirect marginal e￿ect on the wholesale pro￿t.
Thus, taking the wholesale pro￿t not into account when setting retail prices leads only
to a minor distortion for small wholesale margins. Taken together, for wholesale prices
close to marginal costs, the positive e￿ect from softening competition dominates. Hence
it is always better to set the wholesale price slightly above the true marginal cost, until
the marginal e￿ects are equalized.
The role of wholesale prices di￿ers from that of access-prices in La￿ont, Rey, and
Tirole (1998a). In their model of network interconnection, the level of the access price
does not in￿uence the market share since it equally applies to both domestic competi-
tors. Therefore, even the industry monopoly pro￿ts can be attained provided the retail
equilibrium exists. In our model, taking aj as given and increasing the bilateral whole-
sale price of alliance i decreases its market share. The danger of losing too much market
share keeps wholesale prices below the level that maximizes industry pro￿ts.
The next proposition summarizes some comparative statics:
Proposition 6 Suppose that Assumption 2 holds.
i) The equilibrium wholesale price a is decreasing in the degree of competition on the
retail market .
ii) Suppose that the per customer demand function ~ q is more elastic than q: ~ q(p) >
q(p) 8p 2 E. Denote the corresponding equilibrium wholesale prices by ~ a and a.
If the per customer demand ~ q is weakly higher than q at the equilibrium price a (i.e.
~ q(a)  q(a)), then ~ a < a.
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 6 con￿rms that the comparative statics are as expected. Part i) states
that an increase in the degree of retail competition reduces the wholesale equilibrium
prices. If the taste di￿erences of customers are small, then the negative e￿ect of losing
market share when increasing the wholesale price is strong relative to the competition
softening e￿ect. Hence alliances ￿nd it optimal to set a small wholesale markup.
Part ii) compares di￿erences in the elasticity of demand. When demand is more
elastic, then the dead-weight loss invoked by setting the wholesale price above marginal
costs becomes more pronounced.39 In addition, the marginal gains from reduced com-
39Proposition 6, part ii) also requires that the more elastic demand function ~ q generates higher
demand for the old equilibrium wholesale price: ~ q(a)  q(a). Together with the requirement of
higher elasticity this implies that ~ q(a)  q(a) 8a < a. This additional requirement is needed to avoid
counter-intuitive e￿ects that arise from softer competition. In general, higher demand has similar
16petition which are proportional to demand, diminish quicker as prices are increased.
Taken together, more elastic demand serves to discipline alliances.
Examples. The results of this section can be illustrated by some common de-
mand functions that admit explicit solutions. First, we assume that the per customer




i  q and the equilibrium wholesale price can be determined explicitly by solv-
ing condition (14): a
 q = c + 1
2 q. This formula con￿rms that the equilibrium price is
decreasing in the degree of competition .
Another example that admits an explicit solution is the commonly used constant
elasticity demand ~ q(p) = A
p. Using this speci￿cation, the equilibrium wholesale price is
a
~ q = c + c
2+2A. If A 
 




 q)   q and the hypothesis of proposition 6,
part ii) is satis￿ed. Indeed, for A =
 
c q + 1
2

, we get a
~ q = c + c
3+2 qc < a
 q.
It remains to assess the e￿ects of alliances. Like in section 4 every operator achieves a
market share of 1





 depends only on the market share but not on the absolute level of retail prices, it
is equally high with and without alliances. However, compared to section 4, operators
additionally earn a strictly positive wholesale margin which makes them better of in
total.
Subscribers are unambiguously worse o￿ once alliances have formed because of two
reasons: First, the overall surplus generated by roaming calls decreases when retail per
call prices are above true marginal costs. In addition, by the preceding paragraph, in
equilibrium alliances earn higher pro￿ts and hence a smaller part of the surplus (which
is smaller compared to section 4) is retained with the subscribers.
Note that strategic e￿ects could not be achieved if operators Ai and Bi merged
instead of forming an alliance. A merged operator i would possess a network in both
coutries. It would therefore set the retail prices in each coutry as to maximize the sum
of wholesale and retail pro￿ts of both countries. Setting a (virtual) wholesale price
ai 6= c within a merged international operator would be meaningless, as the retail tari￿
in each country is set to maximize the joint pro￿t generated in both countries. The
joint equilibrium pro￿t of a merged operator that competes against one alliance can
be written as 2R(c;aj). It is easy to con￿rm that the industry pro￿t that obtains if
there are two merged operators i and j equals the industry pro￿t in case alliances are
unfeasible.
Policy Intervention: We now analyze the e￿ects of imposing a price cap. In 2007,
the European Commission introduced a price cap both at the retail and the wholesale
level. Prior to this decision, there was a debate whether a single regulatory intervention
in one of these markets might be su￿cient. In our model, imposing a binding price cap
above the true marginal cost solely at the wholesale level clearly increases both welfare
and consumer surplus but reduces industry pro￿ts. However, it turns out that solely
restricting the retail usage price is likely to have a detrimental e￿ect on consumer
welfare.
To see this, consider the e￿ects of a ￿xed retail price cap p. Remember that each
e￿ects as a higher level of . This can be seen analyzing condition (32) and considering ^ q(p) = Aq(p)
for some constant A which yields the same equilibrium condition as considering ^  = A. In principle
we could have normalized ^   1 and set ^ q(p)  1
q(p) but for expositional reasons we have not done
so.
17operator optimally sets the retail usage price pi as to maximize the surplus which is
generated. If the wholesale price ai exceeds the price cap, then the optimal choice is
to set the usage price as high as possible, namely p
i = p. The maximized surplus
generated on the retail stage when respecting the price cap p is therefore:
v(ai) 
(
v(p) + q(p)(p   ai) if ai > p
v(ai) if ai  p
(15)
Clearly, restricting the usage price to lie below p reduces the surplus created at the
retail level whenever ai > p and the demand is decreasing at p:
Remember that all results concerning the retail equilibrium depend on the wholesale
prices only through the surplus which is created at the retail level. Therefore, they
extend to the case when a price cap is in place if we replace v(ai) by the function v(ai).
In particular, if the wholesale prices of the competing alliances are close enough, namely
jv(a0)   v(a1)j < 3
2, then both operators achieve a positive market share determined by
n(ai;aj) = 1
2+ 
3[v(ai) v(aj)] which parallels equation (8). In this case the equilibrium
level of net surplus w













Since the equilibrium per customer retail pro￿t is i
R = v(ai) w
i  CF, in case of
symmetric wholesale prices operators earn i
R = 1
2, which is the same as in section 3.
Thus we can determine the e￿ect of a price cap for given symmetric wholesale prices
as follows:
Lemma 7 Suppose that both alliances set wholesale price a in case of no intervention
and wholesale price a after a price cap p has been introduced. Denote the resulting
retail equilibrium net surplus by w(a) and w(a). The di￿erence in consumer surplus
between both regimes equals the di￿erence of surplus that is generated on the retail level:
w(a)   w(a) = v(a)   v(a).
In particular, if the wholesale price is exogenously ￿xed at a, (i.e. a = a) and the
consumer demand is decreasing at a (i.e. q
0(a) < 0), then introducing a binding price
cap p < a reduces the consumer surplus.
Proof. By the same reasoning as in the proof of Lemma 1, in case of symmetric
wholesale prices the ￿rst order conditions are su￿cient for retail pro￿t maximization.
Solving the system of ￿rst order conditions yields (16). Comparing equation (7) with
ai = aj = a and (16) with ai = aj = a yields the result.
If a = a, q
0(a) < 0 and p < a, then v(a) > v(a) = v(a) so that w(a) > w(a) by
the ￿rst part of the Lemma.
The last part of the previous Lemma implies that even if a regulator could impose a
cap on the usage retail prices and ￿x the wholesale prices, the consumer surplus would
be generally reduced.
However, imposing a price cap on the retail level also in￿uences the equilibrium
wholesale prices. For wholesale prices above p and for an interior con￿guration (0 <
n









i   q(p)(ai   c)]
Let us denote the wholesale per customer pro￿t in case of a binding cap by W
i 
q(p)(ai   c). Independently of the customer demand function, the requirement that in
any symmetric equilibrium marginal pro￿ts are zero yields W = 1
2. Comparing to
the unrestricted equilibrium pro￿ts W =
1 3(a)
2 derived in Proposition 5 reveals that
the per customer pro￿t unambigously increases after the introduction of a cap.
In the proof of the next Proposition we con￿rm that even if the price cap is set
in the most e￿cient way, namely p = c, the e￿ciency gains from lower usage prices
fall short of the di￿erence in equilibrium wholesale pro￿ts. Therefore, introducing a
binding price cap tends to lower consumer surplus:
Proposition 8 Denote by a the equilibrium wholesale price according to proposition 5.
Suppose that Assumption 2 holds and that demand is decreasing at a: q
0(a) < 0.
Then introducing a retail per call price cap p  a decreases consumer surplus and
increases industry pro￿ts. If p < a and the price cap is not set below the true marginal
cost it increases total welfare. If the price cap is su￿ciently close to the unrestricted
equilibrium wholesale price (i.e. q(p)   q(a) <
3(a)
2(a c)) then the equilibrium wholesale
price increases.
Proof. See appendix.
If the mild conditions of Proposition 8 are satis￿ed, restricting the retail per call
price increases total welfare. Since the market is always covered, the retail per call price
uniquely determines total welfare. By hypothesis, the retail price cap reduces this price
and therefore increases total welfare as long as it does not undercut the true marginal
cost.
Two counterveiling e￿ects determine how a price cap in￿uences the wholesale equi-
librium price. A retail price cap prevents operators from passing through high wholesale
prices to the subscribers. Therefore, increasing the wholesale price does not aggravate
the dead-weight loss, which renders higher wholesale prices more attractive. On the
other hand, the cap on the retail price guarantees that each subscriber places at least
q(p) calls. This increases the wholesale pro￿ts per customer and renders subscribers
more valueable, thereby inducing alliances to set lower wholesale prices. Whenever the
condition q(p)   q(a) <
3(a)
2(a c) holds, the ￿rst e￿ect dominates and higher wholesale
prices obtain. Note that for (a) > 0, by continuity of q, a price cap which is set close
enough to a satis￿es this condition and thus increases the wholesale price.
Our results suggest that in order to protect subscribers, price caps should pre-
ferrably be imposed on the wholesale level. This might explain why national regulation
authorities that can usually only intervene on the retail level have mostly chosen not
to regulate roaming prices prior to the intervention of the European Commission.
196 Endogenous formation of alliances
We now endogenize the choice of MNOs to form alliances. Alliances may not be formed
of MNOs within the same country, for example due to legal constraints. 40 Therefore
any alliance consists of exactly one MNO with home country A and another with home
country B. As before, joining an alliance means committing to buy roaming services
from the foreign alliance member at the negotiated mutual wholesale price, even though
another foreign operator may o￿er lower prices.
Formally, we introduce a formation stage that takes place before wholesale prices
are set. In this stage any operator may either announce that it is willing to join an
alliance or remain silent. In order to circumvent coordination failures, we assume that
￿rst both operators in country A declare their intentions.41 The MNOs of country B
observe these declarations before announcing themselves their disposition to engage in
an alliance. Due to our symmetry assumptions, operators are indi￿erent with which
of the two foreign operators to form an alliance. Therefore we assume without loss of
generality that if all operators announce to join an alliance, operators with the same
position in the retail market are matched. If two operators in country x are interested in
forming an alliance, while only one operator in country y, then one of the two operators
in country x is randomly chosen to participate in the alliance. However, the process
how alliances are formed plays only a minor role as long after the formation of alliances
all members retain equal bargaining power and symmetric preferences concerning the
wholesale price.
Our main line of reasoning does not hinge on foreclosure. Therefore we assume that
joining an alliance does not preclude any MNO from selling roaming services to foreign
operators that do not pertain to this alliance. 42 More precisely, after having possibly
joined an alliance and negotiated on internal wholesale prices ai, every MNO may post
a wholesale price ~ axi that applies to foreign operators that have not joined the same
alliance. Thus, even if one alliance has been forged, there remains competition to act
as host operator.
By a similar Bertrand reasoning as in section 4, operators that have not joined an
alliance will buy roaming services at a wholesale price equal to true marginal costs
in equilibrium. Intuitively, suppose that xi and yi have formed an alliance and ￿xed
wholesale price ai while operators xj and yj remain without alliance. The retail pro￿ts
of operator xi are una￿ected by the wholesale price that it charges to deliver roaming
services outside the alliance, since it is obliged to buy roaming services at price ai
and the retail pricing decision of operator xj is independent of its wholesale pro￿ts.
This renders it pro￿table for operator xi to undercut its competitor’s wholesale price
40Suppose all operators could jointly ￿x the wholesale prices of all roaming calls a to maximize joint
pro￿ts (for example by a multilateral agreement). Then, under the assumption that the market is
always fully covered, all operators would agree on a wholesale price that to maximizes joint wholesale




41The equilibirum that we characterize in this section is also an equilibrium if all operators announce
simulateous whether they want to participate in an alliance. The simulaneous setup yields additionally
other equilibria, with one or zero alliances being formed. However, both of these alternative equilibria
lead to lower pro￿ts and therefore operators would coordinate on the more pro￿table equilibrium with
two alliances if possible.
42In addition, domestic regualtion authorities might prohibit alliances that force members not to
sell to outsiders as this behavior might be perceived illegal.
20whenever ~ axj > c: When not undercutting, then operator xi will sell roaming services
only to operator yi that achieves a market share of n(ai;~ axj). By undercutting ~ axj
slightly, the perceived marginal cost of operator yj and hence the retail market shares
stay almost constant. But operator xi then additionally earns strictly positive wholesale
pro￿ts from selling to yj. Since operator xj sells on the wholesale market at most to the
foreign operator yj, it clearly undercuts xi for any ~ axi > c. Hence in any equilibrium,
~ axi = ~ axj = c. Taken together, MNOs that do not join an alliance anticipate being
o￿ered roaming services at the true marginal cost but earning zero wholesale pro￿ts.
Forming an alliance has two e￿ects: First, members of alliance i may coordinate on a
wholesale price that possibly di￿ers from the true marginal costs. Second, if competing
operators j have also formed an alliance, they anticipate the equilibrium wholesale price
a
i and set their wholesale price accordingly. Let a(aj) denote the wholesale price that
an alliance sets to maximize its pro￿t, if it expects its competing operators in both
countries to purchase roaming services at wholesale price aj: The following Lemma
establishes that optimal wholesale prices are complements on the relevant range E:
Lemma 9 Suppose that assumption 2 holds.
i) For any aj 2 E there exists a unique a(aj) 2 E that strictly maximizes (ai;aj) in
R.
ii) For any aj 2 E, the pro￿t maximizing wholesale price a(aj) is strictly increasing in
aj.
iii) If competing operators purchase roaming services at marginal costs c, the optimal
wholesale price within an alliance lies above: a(c) > c.
Proof. See appendix.
The preceeding Lemma implies that each operator prefers creating an additional
alliance to staying alone.43 If operators j do not form an alliance, then members of
alliance i anticipate that non-members will procure roaming services at marginal costs
and therefore set the wholesale price ai = a(c). By Lemma 9, it is still attractive to
form an alliance since (a(c);c) > (c;c).44 If operators j enter an alliance, then
(a;a) > (c;a) > (c;a(c)) where the ￿rst inequality comes from Lemma 9 and
the second re￿ects that the total pro￿t is increasing in the competitors’ prices. 45 Hence
operators i prefer to form a second alliance instead of staying alone. In both cases,
creating an aditional alliance allows its members to commit to higher wholesale prices
than true marginal costs. Higher own prices induce competitors raise their wholesale
prices if possible which aditionally increases own pro￿ts.
The following proposition con￿rms that two alliances emerge in the unique equilib-
rium:
Proposition 10 Suppose that assumption 2 holds. Then a unique subgame perfect equi-
librium exists with two competing alliances being formed. In every country, the market
43Note however, that announcing to form an alliance is not dominant for operators in country B.
Whenever only one MNO in country A announced to form an alliance, remaining silent yields a higher
payo￿ as long as the domestic competitor forms an alliance. This might also explain why domestic
competitors have not complained against the formation of international alliances.








21is equally split between both alliances. Both alliances set the equilibrium wholesale price
characterized by Proposition 5.
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 10 is based on the following intuition: If the announcement of any oper-
ator Bi a￿ects the total number of alliances that are created, given the announcements
of operators in country A and of the competitor Bj, then Bi optimally declares to form
another alliance. Hence in any equilibrium as many MNOs in country B announce
to form an alliance as have already done so in country A. But this implies that any
operator in country A can increase the number of alliances by announcing to form an
alliance. By the preceeding paragraph creating additional alliances increases an oper-
ator’s pro￿t so that both operators in country A announce to form an alliance in the
unique equilibrium.
7 The role of host network selection
This section serves to analyze the competitive impact of recent technological develop-
ments that have improved the home operators’ control over the choice of foreign host
networks for roaming.46 As mentioned in the introduction, by 2006 roughly 80% of the
European roaming tra￿c was already actively directed to preferred networks abroad.
In this section we derive that the possibility of tra￿c direction increases the competi-
tive pressure in the wholesale market. In addition, we point out why the importance of
international alliances has increased in light of these technological developments. While
alliances are welfare reducing when the host network can be selected su￿ciently well,
they are without bite if the host network is randomly determined.
We consider here the polar case of operators having no control on which foreign
network their subscribers log in. Comparing the outcome to the results of the base
model with perfect control allows to understand how the technology of network selection
a￿ects decisions on the pricing and the formation of alliances. For sake of completeness,
appendix B extends the results of this section to intermediate levels of imperfect control.
We assume that operators cannot discriminate the per call price on the retail market
contingent on which foreign network is used. If price discrimination was feasible and
subscribers could actively choose their host network abroad, they would always choose
the cheapest network. Hence their home operator could perfectly control the network
selection by setting the price of the preferred foreign network lower than that of the
not-desired network. The outcome would then be economically equivalent to our base
model.
When buying roaming calls from foreign MNOs on the wholesale market, operator




(ay0 + ay1) (17)
Since operators cannot discriminate the retail prices according to which host network
provides the roaming services, the per call price equals the perceived marginal cost:
46Salsas and Koboldt (2004) o￿er a more extensive treatment of recent technological developments.
22p
xi = cxi: The equilibrium net surplus, market share and the retail equilibrium pro￿ts
remain as established in Lemma 1.
We now turn to the wholesale market.
No international alliances. In absence of alliances the total wholesale demand













The demand does not depend on the actual market share of the reselling operators,
since for all price combinations, both foreign operators purchase half of their tra￿c at





R(cxi;cxj) + (axi   c)Q
NA(axi;axj) (18)
Similar to section 4, in equilibrium each operator takes the foreign wholesale prices
and therefore its retail pro￿ts as given. Therefore operator xi sets its wholesale price in
order to maximize its wholesale pro￿ts (axi   c)QNA(axi;axj). We make the following
mild technical assumption in order to state our ￿rst result:
Assumption 3 The markup elasticity of per customer demand (p) is increasing for
all prices above marginal costs whenever q(p) > 0 and there exists some ~ p > c with
(~ p) = 2.
Lemma 11 Suppose that assumption 3 holds. If operators cannot select the host net-







where q() is the price elasticity of per customer demand.
Proof. The wholesale price axi does not in￿uence operator xi’s retail pro￿ts. Hence,
axi is chosen to maximize 1
2 (axi   c)q
 
1
2 (axi + axj)

. Rearranging the resulting ￿rst
order condition yields condition (19). Rewriting the marginal pro￿t in terms of markup-








￿rst order condition is satis￿ed at ~ p which exists and is unique by Assumption_(3).
The pro￿t is strictly quasiconcave since 0 (p) > 0 whenever q(p) > 0 by assumption.
By Lemma 11, if operators cannot in￿uence which foreign network subscribers use
to place roaming calls, the resulting equilibrium wholesale price is extremely high.
Unilaterally increasing the wholesale price xi causes a negative externality on the rival,
since the wholesale demand of operator xj is reduced while only the margin of operator
xi increases. As operators do not take this externality into account, the resulting
equilibrium price even exceeds the monopoly price.
Two international alliances. Similar to section 5, we now analyze the equilibrium
outcome after operators with same location have formed two competing alliances. We
omit the country index for brevity.
23We restrict operators to sell roaming calls on the wholesale market to all foreign
operators for the same price ai that is negotiated within an alliance. 47 Otherwise,
we maintain all assumptions of the base model but assume that alliance members
cannot commit to direct their subscribers to the partner network. Thus, the only
virtue of alliances that remains is to set the wholesale price cooperatively instead of
competitively.
If both alliances have negotiated wholesale prices ai and aj, the equilibrium whole-




2 (a0 + a1)
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. The
pro￿ts of each operator in alliance i are:











Comparing equations (20) and (18) immediately reveals that the same pro￿ts obtain
for equal wholesale prices. Thus the following Lemma con￿rms that we should expect
the same equilibrium prices:
Lemma 12 Suppose that assumption 3 holds and operators cannot select the host net-
work of their subscribers. The formation of two alliances does not a￿ect the wholesale
equilibrium price, that remains characterized by (19). Ceterus paribus, the equilibrium
wholesale price under random selection of the host network lies above that of perfect
network selection given by Proposition 5.
Proof. The proof of existence and uniqueness parallels that of Lemma (11), since the
same objective function is maximized. For proposition 18 of appendix B we prove that
the equilibrium price decreases with the quality of network selection. In particular, the
equilibrium wholesale price under no control exceeds that of perfect control.
Intuitively, there are two reasons why equilibrium prices are higher if the host net-
work is selected randomly. Firstly, compared to the base model, an alliance’s retail
market share is insensitive to increases of the wholesale price. This is because the per-
ceived marginal costs ci of operators within alliance i and those of the rival alliance j
both depend equally on the own wholesale price ai. Secondly, without control of the
roaming tra￿c, members of alliance j that have to procure half of their subscribers’
roaming calls from alliance i. Therefore, raising the wholesale price ai may increase the
wholesale pro￿t generated from sales to operators of the competing alliance.
The insight that the presence of alliances does not a￿ect the wholesale prices with-
out network control is at ￿rst glance surprising. One might be tempted to conject
that alliances mitigate the problem of double marginalization as in Carter and Wright
47Even though this restriction might seem very restrictive at ￿rst glance, it allows to better compare
the results with those of the base model. When allowing MNOs to discriminate between members of
the alliance and non-members, then the wholesale price ~ ai that applies to non-members will be set
extremely high and in many cases there is no equilibrium. Intuitively, as foreign operator j that is not
in alliance i has to half of its roaming calls from operator i, setting a high ~ ai increases the perceived
marginal costs of operator j and therefore increases the retail market share of alliance i.
24(1994).48 However, because competition on the retail market is in two part tari￿s, dou-
ble marginalization is not an issue since no deadweight loss is caused on the retail level.
Since increasing the wholesale price unilaterally increases the perceived marginal costs
of both domestic competitors, it does not a￿ect the retail pro￿ts. Therefore members
of an alliance cannot increase their pro￿ts by coordinating on a wholesale price that
di￿ers from the individually optimal level. So there is no point in forming an alliance,
as with or without alliances the subscribers are divided evenly among the foreign net-
works. Compared to the base model, international alliances are unattractive without
the technology to direct subscribers to foreign partner networks. Our model therefore
provides an explanation why in Europe international roaming alliances were formed
mainly after a powerful network selection technologies have become available.
8 Extensions
The base model is constructed to point out our main result of potentially harmful
alliances while keeping our model tractable. We relax the assumption of homogenous
customers in section 8.1 in order to show that this generalization does not change
our main results qualitatively. In section 8.2 we vary the admissible set of pricing
instruments.
8.1 Heterogeneous consumers
Our main result of this section is that heterogeneous consumers lead to unambiguously
lower pro￿ts in equilibrium. However, alliances still serve to raise equilibrium pro￿ts
since the equilibrium pro￿ts decrease only gradually in the degree of heterogeneity. As
in section 5 we assume that operators of both countries with same position in their home
market have formed alliances. As all results are valid for both countries, we omit the
country index for brevity of notation. In this section, we focus on candidate symmetric
equilibria that satisfy the necessary ￿rst order conditions of pro￿t maximization.
Retail demand structure. In contrast to our main setup, there are two types
of consumers indicated by k with k 2 fL;Hg and L < H.49 We assume that the
consumer’s type is observable by the MNOs but will discuss later the implications of
relaxing this assumption. A consumer of type k values roaming calls according to
vk(p)  kv(p) with v(p) remaining de￿ned as in section 2. Likewise, uk(q) denotes
the utility that a subscriber of type k obtains from consuming q roaming calls.50 Sub-
scribers still have quasilinear preferences so that the demand of an k subscriber is given
by qk(p)  kq(p). The measure of subscribers remains normalized to 1 in every country.
A proportion  of these are light users with type L and relatively low demand. Like-
wise, the remaining fraction of 1  are heavy users characterized by H. Without loss
48In contrast to our model, they assume that there is a monopolist in each country and that the
monopolists set linear tari￿s both on the wholesale and retail market. They ￿nd that if operators
cooperatively set wholesale prices to maximize their pro￿ts, then both consumer surplus and pro￿ts
exceed the uncooperative outcome. This result obtains as cooperation allows to circumvent the double-
marginalization problem.
49In a model of network interconnection, Dessein (2003) uses a similar setup.
50Note that due to our speci￿cation, uk(q) 6= ku(q) in general.
25of generality, we normalize L < 1 < H such that L+(1   )H  1. This normaliza-
tion allows to interpret q(p) as the mean demand per consumer at per call prices p. All
consumers have the same degree of di￿erentiation  and the location of the consumers is
stochastically independent from their type. For future reference, we de￿ne the hetero-
geneity of consumers as the variance of their type:    (L   1)
2 +(1   )(H   1)
2.
If  = 0, we are back in the base model with homogeneous consumers.
Retail pricing structure. Similar to section 3, operator i sets the retail per call
price pki and the ￿xed fee Fki for a type k subscriber. We equivalently express the
problem in terms of quantity qki  qk(pki) and net surplus wki  uk(qki) qkipki Fki.51
As before, the ￿xed component Fki can be easily recovered for any level of quantity and
net surplus.
Wholesale pricing structure. MNOs still charge a linear wholesale price to
foreign operators. MNOs cannot discriminate the wholesale prices according to which
type of customers the roaming calls are sold ￿nally.










k (wki;qki;cki)  uk(qki)   wki   qkici   CF being the per customer retail
pro￿t and nki = nk(wki;wkj)  1
2 + (wki   wkj) being the market share in segment
k 2 fL;Hg .
Retail equilibrium. The surplus generated when o￿ering quantity q to a customer
of type k is de￿ned as follows: sk(q;c)  uk(q)   cq. By the same reasoning as in
section 3, it is optimal to o￿er subscribers of type k the quantity qFB
k that maximizes
the surplus which is generated at perceived marginal costs ci:52
q
FB
k (ci)  argmax
q fuk(q)   qcig
By de￿nition, we have uk(qFB


























If both competitors have equal perceived marginal costs, then each of them controls
a market share of n
ki = 1
2 in the candidate retail equilibrium. This implies R
ki = 1
2
and therefore the per customer pro￿ts are constant across both segments. Inserting the
optimal tari￿s in (21) and rearranging yields that for perceived marginal costs (ci;cj),














+  (vi   vj)
2
(23)
51In contrast to section 3, we express the problem in terms of the per customer quantity qki of the
price pki since this makes it easier to consider more complicated pricing structures when discussing
second-degree price discrimination.
52The quantity qFB
k equals the quantity that would be chosen by a subscriber when the per call
price equals the perceived marginal costs.
26where vi  v(ci) as before. Comparing this equation to (9) reveals that consumer
heterogeneity does not a￿ect the retail pro￿ts if ci = cj. However, for ci 6= cj both
operators earn higher retail pro￿ts compared to section 3. This can be best understood
by noting that given the perceived marginal costs (c0;c1) the average market share of
both operators n
i = n
iL +(1   )n
iH equals the market share that obtains in case of
homogenous subscribers. For ci 6= cj, n
iL 6= n
iH so that both operators are better of
since the retail pro￿ts are convex in the market share.













+  (vi   vj)
2
(24)











Using the previous results and simplifying yields:







(v(ci)   v(cj))(1 + )

The previous equation shows that consumer heterogeneity renders the mean quantity
more sensible to di￿erences in the perceived costs. The reason is that according to (22),
an operator that faces higher costs also o￿ers less attractive tari￿s. This di￿erence
increases in the subscriber’s type. Since the level of di￿erentiation  is independent of
the type, the market shares in the heavy user segment are always less balanced than in
the light user segment.
Wholesale equilibrium. As in section 5, we now consider two competing alliances.
The negotiated wholesale prices equal the perceived marginal costs when setting the
retail o￿ers. The pro￿ts per member of the alliance remain de￿ned as in (12), using the













(ai   c)(1 + )q(ai)
2
We can characterize the the symmetric equilibrium wholesale price in a compact
way, after de￿ning the equilibrium share of roaming calls (in contrast to the market
share of subscribers) as follows: ~ n
i = 1
2 + 
3 (v(ci)   v(cj))(1 + ). Note that the
additional factor 1 +  indicates that the equilibrium share of roaming calls ~ n
i reacts
more sensitively to di￿erences in wholesale prices compared to the equilibrium share of
subscribers n






q(a) + ~ n
i(a)
 (25)








i being the price elasticity of the equilibrium share of calls. In particular, in a
53jv(a0)   v(a1)j < 3
2H
27symmetric equilibrium the share of roaming calls is ~ n
i = 1
2 and ~ ni(ai) = 2
3 (1 + )aiq(ai).
Now we can identify the e￿ect of consumer heterogeneity on the candidate equilibrium
wholesale price:
Proposition 13 Suppose that 25 uniquely characterizes the equilibrium wholesale price.
Then an increase in consumer heterogeneity , holding everything else constant, reduces
the symmetric wholesale equilibrium price.
Proof.
In any equilibrium, condition (25) must be satis￿ed. Observe that for ~ n
i = 1
2
~ ni(ai) = 2
3 (1 + )aiq(ai) is increasing in . By the same reasoning as in the proof




q(ai) + ~ n
i(ai)

  1 is increasing in ai. Applying the implicit
function theorem on condition (25) yields then da
d < 0.
Intuitively, consumer heterogeneity renders reducing the wholesale price more prof-
itable since this allows to attract disproportionately many heavy users.
Non observable customer types: We now argue that even when customer types
are unobservable for the MNOs, the results of this section are likely to remain intact.
Since customers’ type k is now unobersable to the operators, they have to elicit this
information by o￿ering incentive compatible contracts. Without loss of generality, we
consider direct revelation mechanisms. We slightly modify the retail pricing structure
and allow operators to o￿er quantity qLi at tari￿ TLi for light users and quantity qHi at
tari￿ THi for heavy users.54
When joining operator i, heavy users select the package which is designed for them
if:
wHi  wLi + u(qLi) (26)
where u(q)  uH(q)   uL(q). Likewise, the incentive constraint for light users is:
wLi  wHi   u(qHi) (27)
It turns out that in any symmetric equilibrium, the incentive constraints (26) and
(27) are slack. This at ￿rst glance surprising result is in line with the observation of
Armstrong and Vickers (2001) and Rochet and Stole (2002), that private information
of consumers may not cause any quantity distortions in competitive environments. 55
To con￿rm that the sorting conditions are satis￿ed, we insert the retail equilibrium
54Due to the consumer heterogeneity and in contrast to section 3, operators can now generally do
better than o￿ering two part tari￿s. Therefore, we allow operators in this section to set the quantity
for each segment instead of the price per call. However, it turns out that the optimal quantity for each
type of customer would equal the quantity that this customer would consume if the per call price was
set to the perceived marginal costs.
55They also discuss the sensitivity of this result with respect to crucial assumptions like symmetry.














By de￿nition of qFB
L (ci) and qFB
H (ci) the left hand side is non-negative while the
right hand side is non-positive. Therefore, if c0 and c1 are close enough together,
(26) and (27) are not binding for both operators. In particular, this is true in any
symmetric candidate equilibrium where c0 = c1. This means that any wholesale prices
a
0 = a
1 = a that satisfy (25) for n
i = 1
2 also locally maximize the operators’ pro￿ts in
case they cannot observe the subscribers’ type. Whenever these prices are also global
maximizers, they form an equilibrium even if operators have to resort to second degree
price di￿erentiation on the retail market.
8.2 Allowing for per customer wholesale fees
So far, we have assumed that operators can only charge linear prices on the wholesale
level. This assumption re￿ects roughly the wholesale price structure that is used in
practice at the moment. However, in this section we show that two-part tari￿s on the
upstream level render alliances even more pro￿table. More precisely, we assume that
operators may both charge a per call wholesale-price axi as above and a fee xi that
has to be paid for any foreign customer that visits the network. 58 As in section 5, we
assume that operators with same position have formed alliances. We focus on country
A (by symmetry the same results hold for country B) and omit the country index for
brevity. The retail pro￿t of operator i conditional on alliance i having agreed on aiand




R(pi;wi;wj;ai;i)  n(wi;wj)[q(pi)(pi   ai) + v(pi)   wi   i   CF] (29)
The per customer customer fee enters as perceived ￿xed costs and therefore renders
customers less attractive for the operator in the retail market. The optimal retail per
call price remains equal to the wholesale per call price of the alliance. By the same
























Using these results for the retail market, the modi￿ed ￿rst order conditions which
characterize the optimal per call wholesale price ~ a

















56Whenever the optimal net surplus given by equation (22) satis￿es (28), then it is indeed a maxi-
mizer of retail pro￿ts. By the same reasoning as in the proof of Lemma 1, setting the e￿cient quantity
qFB
k (ci) and net surplus as given in (22) maximizes retail pro￿t in any segment. If this solution yields
a maximum of the unrestricted problem, it remains the solution of the restricted problem, as long as
conditions (26) and (27) are satis￿ed.
57The ￿rst inequality comes from the upward incentive constraint and the second from the downward
incentive constraint.
58Note that this pricing structure di￿ers from two-part tari￿s used for example as franchise fees. In
our setup, the ￿xed fee xi is paid for any customer. In contrast, a franchise fee is paid only once.
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i   c) + 

i
denotes the per customer wholesale pro￿t and () denotes the per customer demand
elasticity in terms of markup.
Inserting condition (31) into condition (30) yields n
i(~ a
i) = 0 which for n
i 6= 0
is only satis￿ed for ~ a
i = c. Hence as long as operator i expects to achieve a strictly
positive retail market share, it is optimal to set the wholesale per call price equal to
the true marginal costs.
The following proposition uses this insight to establish that if operators have the
possibility to charge wholesale per customer fees, equilibrium pro￿ts will be higher and
consumers will be worse o￿.
Proposition 14 Suppose operators have formed two competing alliances. If each al-
liance can negotiate both on wholesale per call prices and on per customer fees, there
exists a unique symmetric equilibrium. In this equilibrium wholesale per call prices are




any symmetric equilibrium without per customer fees, each operator’s wholesale pro￿t
is higher. Let a denote the symmetric equilibrium wholesale price that obtains under
linear wholesale prices and is characterized by Proposition (5). Then introducing per
customer wholesale fees increases total welfare by  
R a
i
c (x   c)q0(x)dx.
Proof.
First note that in any symmetric equilibrium, each operator has market share n
i = 1
2
and hence earns retail pro￿ts of R
i = 1
2. Inserting these values and ~ a
i = c into
equation (31) yields 
i = 1
2. Furthermore, this critical point is a maximum, since
@2
@2
i (i;j) =  1
3   
9 < 0 for (i;j) such that n
i 2 (0;1). It can be easily veri￿ed
that (i;j)  (j   3
2;j) for all i < j   3
2, so that cornering the market is













Inserting market share n
i = 1





2 = ~ W
i .
As by assumption the whole market is covered in both cases, the di￿erence in









c (x   c)q0(x)dx > 0.
Intuitively, increasing the per customer fee allows to soften retail competition more
e￿ciently than by increasing the wholesale per call price within an alliance. Introducing
per customer fees reduces the per customer retail pro￿ts for any net surplus and retail
per call price. However, by raising the per customer fee and setting the wholesale price
equal to the true marginal costs, members of an alliance leave the retail per call price
at the socially optimal level and therefore avoid deadweight loss.
309 Conclusion
This paper presents a tractable model of international roaming in which operators
compete both on a wholesale and retail market simultaneously. We have accounted
for recent technological developments and based our analysis on the assumption that
MNOs may determine which foreign network their subscribers use to place roaming
calls. We have shown that operators have incentives to form alliances that mutually
provide roaming services at ine￿ciently high wholesale prices which translate to high
retail prices. We have also shown that the ban of mutual roaming agreements might
bring down roaming prices. Our suggestion might have constituted an easier approach
than the price cap on roaming prices which was introduced by the European Parliament
in 2007.
A Appendix - Proofs of Lemmas & Propositions
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1:
(We omit the country index for brevity). We show that whenever v(ci)   v(cj)  3
2
there exists a unique equilibrium in pure weakly undominated strategies, which entails
n
i = 1 and n
j = 0.




2   CF + v(cj), p
j = cj and w
j = v(cj)   CF. De￿ne ~ wi such that given
wj;v(ci);v(cj), operator i just serves the whole market: 1
2 + (~ wi   wj) = 1. Note that
whenever n
i = 1 then necessarily w
i = ~ wi as setting wi > ~ wi(wj) would yield strictly
lower pro￿ts and w
i < ~ wi would contradict n
i = 1.
We now show that whenever n
j = 0, then necessarily w
j = v(cj)   CF and p
j = cj:
Any strategy (wj;pj) with R(wj;pj) < 0 is weakly dominated by pj = cj and wj = w
j.
Any strategy with R(wj;pj)  0 and pj 6= cj is weakly dominated by choosing pj = cj
and while leaving wj constant as this increases pro￿ts per customer. Hence we have
p
j = cj in any equilibrium. It remains to show that whenever n
j = 0, then w
j =
v(cj) CF. Suppose to the contrary that wj < v(cj) CF. By the preceding discussion,
necessarily wi = ~ wi(wj). Then player j could achieve a strictly positive market share
and per customer pro￿t by deviating to wj +
v(cj) CF wj
2 which contradicts equilibrium.
We now show that a unique corner equilibrium arises i￿ v(ci)   v(cj)  3
2: (If-
Existence) Given, w
j = v(cj)   CF and w
i = 1
2   CF + v(cj), it can be directly
veri￿ed that @R
@wi (wi;w
j;ci) > 0 for wi < w
i and @R
@wj (wj;w
i;ci) < 0 for wj > w
j




pro￿t maximizing. (If-Uniqueness): There exists no interior equilibrium since inserting
v(ci)   v(cj)  3
2 into (8) yields n
i  1 which is not interior. By the reasoning
above, there is only one corner equilibrium in weakly undominated strategies. (Only-
if): Suppose that 0  v(ci) v(cj) < 3
2: For w
j = v(cj) CF as required in any corner
equilibrium, the best response of player i is w
i < ~ wi which implies n
i < 1 and therefore
causes a contradiction.
31A.2 Proof of Lemma 3:
Note ￿rst that any trembling hand perfect equilibrium contains no weakly dominated
strategy (see e.g. Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995), p. 259).
Suppose to the contrary that n(a
i;a
j) = 1 which implies (a
j;a
i) = 0. De￿ne
the highest wholesale price that allows to corner the market ai implicitely by v(ai) =
v(a
j)+ 3
2. We show that any trembling-hand perfect equilibrium requires a
i  c since
any ai < c is weakly dominated by a
i = c: Whenever a
j is such that ai < c, then for











W(ai) < 0 and (ai)  0. For ai < ai, @
@ai(ai;aj) =  q(ai)(ai)  0. Thus for ai < c
and for any ai < c, (c;a
j) > (ai;a










deviating to ^ aj = a
i yields (^ aj;a
i)  1
4 contradicting optimality of a
j.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 4:
We prove the following properties that together imply the claim.
For all (ai;aj) s.t. n(ai;aj) 2 (0;1) the following inequalities hold:
i) If ai < c then
@(ai;aj)
@ai > 0.
ii) If q(ai) = 0 then (c;aj) > (ai;aj).









By assumption 1, q(ai)  q(c) > 0 which implies that W(ai) < 0 for ai < c and
thus by equation (13), @
@ai(ai;aj) > 0.
Part ii)
Any ai with q(ai) = 0 implies that ai > c and q
0(ai) = 0 by assumption 1. As
q(a
0) = 0 8a
0  ai, we have v(aj)  v(ai) and hence n(ai;aj)  1
2. In addition,
q(ai) = 0 implies q(ai)(ai   c) = 0. Hence (ai;aj) = 1
n(ai;aj)2 < 1
n(c;aj)2 
(c;aj) holds which contradicts ai being optimal. To see that (c;aj)  1
n(c;aj)2,
distinguish two cases: if v(c)   v(aj)  3
2, then (c;aj) = 1
n(c;aj)2 by Lemma 1. If
v(c)   v(aj) > 3
2, then by the same Lemma W
i > 1
 and hence (c;aj) > 1
n(c;aj)2.
Part iii)
Since (ai)  1












If (ai)  1
3 then by part iii) the claim follows. If (ai) < 1
3 then by assump-
tion 2, for all ~ ai 2 [c;ai], (~ ai) < (ai). By de￿nition v
0(p) =  q(p) and the condition
v(c)   v(ai) < 3
2 is equivalent to
R ai
c q(a)da < 3
2. By assumption 2, 
0(~ ai)  0 for
~ ai 2 [c;ai] and thus W(ai) =
R ai





c q(a)da  3
2 implies W(ai)  (1   (ai)) 3
2. From (13) we have @
@ai(ai;aj)  
1






3   (ai)   1

















A.4 Proof of Proposition 5
We ￿rst prove the following auxiliary Lemma:
32Lemma 15 If assumption 2 holds, then:
i) W(ai) is concave on E in ai.
ii) Given aj 2 E, any ai 2 E that satis￿es the ￿rst order necessary conditions for being
a local maximum of (ai;aj) in E strictly maximizes (ai;aj) in E.
Proof.
Part i) @W
@p (p) = (p c)q
0(p)+q(p) = q(p)(1   (p)). Hence @2W
@p2 (p) = q
0 (p)(1   (p)) 
q (p)
0(p) < 0 as 
0(p) > 0 by assumption 2 and 1   (p) > 0 for p 2 E.
Part ii) Suppose that ai;a
0
i 2 E, ai 6= a
0
i. By de￿nition of E, 8ai;aj 2 E, since
jv(c)   v(ai)j < 3
2 we have n (ai;aj) 2 (0;1). We show that
@(ai;aj)
@ai (ai   a
0
i)  0














E. For brevity, de￿ne '(ai;aj)  (1   3(ai))n













i < 0 as  > 0, (ai) < 1
3
and 
0(ai)  0 by assumption 2.
We ￿rst show that
@(ai;aj)




@ai < 0 for a
0
i > ai: By (13) and
q(ai) > 0 in E,
@(ai;aj)
@ai  0 implies '(ai;aj)  0. But
@'(ai;aj)
@ai < 0 implies '(a
0
i;aj) < 0





We next show that
@(ai;aj)








@ai  0 implies
'(ai;aj)  0 and by
@'(ai;aj)
@ai < 0 we get '(a
0





Proof of Proposition 5.
We ￿rst show existence of a symmetric equilibrium a
0 = a




2. By Lemma 4 this equilibrium involves a 2 E. De￿ne  (p)  (1   3(p)) 
2W(p). Note that by assumption 2, and as @W
@p (p) > 0 for (p) < 1, we have  
0(p) < 0
in the interior of E. Using (13) and n
i = 1
2, the necessary ￿rst order condition is
 (a) = 0. Note that  (c) = 1 > 0. Distinguish two cases:
 There exists some p 2 R such that (p) = 1
3.60 De￿ne ~ p = min





Then  (~ p) =  2W(~ p) < 0. By continuity there must exist a unique ^ a in R+
such that  (^ a) = 0.
 There does not exist some p 2 P such that (p) = 1
3. Then for all p  c,
p 2 E and hence  
0(p) < 0. In addition, using (p) < 1
3 8p  c implies that
limp!1 W(p) = 1.61 Hence limp!1  (p) =  1 and again there exists a unique
^ a in E such that  (^ a) = 0.
By Lemma 4,  (^ a) = 0 and q(^ a) > 0 can only be satis￿ed for ^ a 2 E and since  
0(a) < 0
in the interval E, ^ a is unique in E.
59This property is usually denoted strict pseudoconcavity and is stronger than strict
quasiconcavity.






3 8p  c yields
R q
0(p)
q(p) dp   2
3
R 1







which goes to in￿nity as p ! 1.
33It remains to show that the candidate ^ a is indeed a symmetric equilibrium. By
de￿nition of   , ai = ^ a satis￿es the necessary ￿rst order condition when aj = ^ a. By
Lemma 15, the ￿rst order conditions are also su￿cient for being a global maximum on
E. By the proof of Lemma 4, ai = ^ a remains a maximizer on the set of all ai 2 R such
that n(ai;aj) 2 (0;1). Setting ai high enough so that ni = 0 cannot be optimal either,
as this gives zero pro￿ts.
It remains to show that (^ a;^ a)  (~ ai;^ a) for ~ aisuch that n(~ ai;^ a) = 1. Since ^ a 2 E,
the inequality v(c) < v(^ a)+ 3
2 holds. Cornering the market requires v(~ ai)  v(^ a)+ 3
2,
and thus ~ ai < c . For any ai < c such that v(ai) > v(aj) + 3
2 , marginal pro￿ts are
@
@ai(ai;aj) =  q(ai)(ai)  0 since (ai)  0. Thus (~ ai;^ a)  (c;^ a) < (^ a;^ a).
Uniqueness:
There is no other symmetric equilibrium since any interior equilibrium must belong
to E and since the necessary ￿rst order condition is uniquely satis￿ed in E at ^ a by the
previous discussion.
We now show that no asymmetric equilibrium exists:









j). By Lemma 3, this
equilibrium must involve a strictly positive market share for both alliances and a strictly




















































by Lemma 4, a
i;a
j 2 E. Hence 1
3  (a
i)  (a





















j) = 0 which
contradicts the ￿rst order necessary conditions.
Finally, we show that a > c: Any equilibrium involves n(a
i;a
j) 2 (0;1). The
necessary ￿rst order condition (13) for a
i = c is n(c;a
j)
q(c)
3 = 0 which is never true as
q(c) > 0 by assumption 1.
Rearranging the equilibrium condition  (a) = 0 yields the equilibrium per customer
pro￿ts.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 6
Rewriting condition 14 for a symmetric equilibrium yields
2q(a
)(a
   c) + 3(a
)   1 = 0 (32)
Part i) Applying the implicit function theorem on this condition, the claim is
true if @
@a (2q(a)(a   c) + 3(a)) > 0. By assumption 2, 
0(a) > 0. In addition,
@
@aq(a)(a   c) > 0 since (a) < 1
3 which completes the proof.
Part ii) Consider any pair of demand functions q and ~ q with ~ q(a) > q(a) 8a 2 P
and ~ q(a)  q(a). Since (a) = q(a)a c
a , ~ q(a) > q(a) implies ~ q(a) > q(a) for
34a   c > 0. We show that the equilibrium wholesale price ~ a that corresponds to per
customer demand ~ q is higher than the equilibrium price a for demand q. By the proof
of proposition 5, the function  q(a)  2q(a)(a   c) + 3q(a)   1 is increasing in a for
a 2 E and  q(c) =  1. De￿ne  ~ q(a) likewise for demand ~ q: To show that ~ a 2 (c;a),
just note that  ~ q(a) >  q(a) = 0 where the ￿rst inequality comes from the hypothesis
~ q(a)  q(a) and ~ q(a)   q(a) > 0 and the last equality is the equilibrium condition
of a being an equilibrium for demand q. Since  ~ q(a) > 0, by continuity there exists
an ~ a < a such that  ~ q(~ a) = 0. This equilibrium candidate is indeed an equilibrium
for demand ~ q by the proof of proposition 5.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 8
We ￿rst prove the following auxiliary Lemma:
Lemma 16 If assumption 2 holds and q
0(a) < 0, then v(c)   v(a) < 1
2, where a is
the equilibrium wholesale price de￿ned by Proposition 5.
Proof.
The equilibrium condition @
@ai(a;a) = 0 yields W  q(a)(a   c) =
1 3(a)
2 .
Assumption 2 implies that v(c)   v(p) 
W(p)
1 (p) for any p 2 E. Putting these results





2 where the last inequality is due
to 1
3  (a) > 0.
We now show existence of a unique symmetric equilibrium. Denote the wholesale
price that obtains after the retail price cap has been introduced by a and the equi-
librium net surplus as w. By the same reasoning as in Lemma 15, the ￿rst order
condition is su￿cient for a (local) maximum. Similar to the proof of Proposition 5, we




@ai (a;a) = 1   2q(p)(a   c). We claim that that wholesale prices
a0 = a1 = a with a being uniquely characterized by  (a) = 0 support an equilibrium.
By de￿nition of  , the equilibrium price a locally strictly maximizes both alliances’
pro￿ts.
Next we show that (ai;a) is strictly quasiconcave in ai if both alliances have
a positive market share: De￿ne n(ai;aj)  1
2 + 
3 [v(ai)   v(aj)] using the gener-









W(ai)  q(p)(ai   c). Since @
@ai(a;a) = 0 and n(ai;a) decreases in ai while
W(ai) increases in ai, we have (a   ai) @
@ai(ai;a) > 0 for ai > p and ai 6= a. For





(1   3(ai))n(ai;aj)   W(ai)

which di￿ers from 13 only
by the market share n(ai;a) instead of n(ai;a). We show below that v(a) < v(a)
which implies n(ai;a) > n(ai;a) for ai < p. Since by hypothesis p  a, we have
@
@ai(ai;a) > @
@ai(ai;a) > 0 where the last inequality is due to Lemma (15).
It remains to prove that drastic deviations in order to corner the market are un-
pro￿table. We ￿rst show that given p < a, any deviation wholesale price ~ ai to corner
the market requires that ~ ai < c or equivalently v(~ ai) > v(c). To derive a lower bound
for v  v(a), note that v = v(p)   q(p)(a   p) = v(c)   W  
R p
c (p)q(p)dp with
W  q(p)(a   c). The equilibrium condition  (a) = 0 implies W = 1
2. Besides,
35p  a 2 E guarantees that
R p
c (p)q(p)dp  (p)(v(c)   v(p))  1
3 (v(c)   v(a)) < 1
6,
where the last inequality is due to Lemma 16. Taken together, v > v(c)  4
6. Corner-
ing the market requires v(~ ai)  v + 3
2 > v(c) + 5
6 > v(c). For any ai < c such that
v(ai) > v + v(aj) , marginal pro￿ts are @
@ai(ai;aj) =  q(ai)(ai)  0 since (ai)  0.
Thus (~ ai;a)  (c;a) < (a;a).
The preceeding two paragraphs establish that there is no pro￿table deviation, which
completes the proof of existence.
We now show that v < v(a), which by help of Lemma 7 su￿ces to prove that any
binding price cap reduces the consumer surplus. The condition v(p)   q(p)(a   p) <
v(a) can be rewritten as v(p)+q(p)(p   c) W < v(a) and is satis￿ed if v(c) W <
v(a) since v(p) + q(p)(p   c)  v(c). Reordering this condition and using W = 1
2
yields v(c)   v(a) < 1
2 which is true by Lemma 16.
If p < a, then clearly v(p) + q(p)(p   c) > v(a) + q(a)(a   c) and total welfare
increases.
Comparing  (a) to  (a) de￿ned in the proof of Proposition 5 yields  (a)    (a) =
3(a) + 2 (q(a)   q(p)(a   c). Therefore, the condition  (a) >  (a) = 0 holds by
the hypothesis q(p)   q(a) <
3(a)
2(a c). Since  
0
(a) =  q(p) < 0,  (a) > 0 implies
 (a) = 0 for a > a.
A.7 Proof of Lemma 9
Part i)
Note that for all ai;aj 2 E, n(ai;aj) 2 (0;1) by de￿nition of E.
We show that for any aj 2 E there exists a unique ^ a 2 E such that '(^ a;aj) 
(1   3(ai))n(^ a;aj) W(ai) = 0. Since
@(ai;aj)
@ai = 1
3q(ai)'(ai;aj) and by Lemma 15,
part ii), ai = ^ a strictly maximizes (ai;aj) in E. By Lemma 4, ^ a remains a strict
maximizer in R.
Note that '(c;aj) = n(c;aj) > 0. Distinguish two cases:
 There exists some p 2 R such that (p) = 1
3. De￿ne ~ p = min





Then '(~ p;aj) =  W(~ p) < 0. By continuity and by
@'(ai;aj)
@ai < 0 for ai;aj 2 E,
there must exist a unique ^ a (which is necessarily in E) such that '(^ a;aj) = 0.
 There does not exist somep 2 R such that (p) = 1
3. Then for all ai  c,
ai 2 E and hence
@'(ai;aj)
@ai < 0. In addition, using (ai) < 1
3 8ai  c implies
that limai!1 W(ai) = 1. Hence limai!1 '(ai) =  1 and again there exists a
unique ^ a in E such that '(^ a;aj) = 0.
Part ii)
Any pro￿t maximizing wholesale price a(aj) involves @
@ai(a(aj);aj) = 0. By
Lemma 15, part ii), any critical point is also a strict maximum which implies @2
@a2
i (a(aj);aj) <
0. Therefore, by the implicit function theorem, the claim is true if @2
@ai@aj(a(aj);aj) > 0.








Follows immediately from Lemma 4 and condition (14)
36A.8 Proof of Proposition 10
We ￿rst show that operators in country B announce to form an alliance if this increases
the total number of alliances. Suppose that operator Bi does not announce to form
an alliance, but all other operators do so. Then one alliance is formed and Bi as
well as one operator in country A, say Ai, remain without alliance. The remaining
alliance j anticipates that Ai and Bi will provide and purchase roaming services at
the true marginal costs and sets the intra-alliance wholesale price aj = a(c) that
maximizes the pro￿ts of its members. According to Lemma 9, this price uniquely
exists and exceeds the true marginal costs: a(c) > c. For operator Bi this yields
pro￿ts R(c;a(c)) (using notation of section 3). Since own pro￿ts increase in the
competitors’ wholesale prices, the following string of inequalities holds by Lemma 9:
R(c;a(c)) = (c;a(c)) < (c;a) < (a;a) with a(c) < a and a de￿ned
by proposition 5. Hence operator Bi has higher pro￿ts if it announces to form an
alliance, too. Lemma 9 also implies that (a(c);c) > (c;c) which makes announcing
an alliance a best response for Bi if only one operator in A has announced to form
an alliance and Bj declares to stay alone.62 Given the best response of operators of
country, B, the same reasoning for operators in country A yields the result.
B Appendix - Continuous model of network selection
We assume that at most the proportion   2 [0:5;1] of roaming calls can be directed
to a particular foreign network. 63 This bound on the proportion re￿ects the fact that
the restriction does not come from capacity constraints (which would render an abso-
lute constraint more plausible) but rather from an unreliable technology that cannot
guarantee that a subscriber registers in the preferred network. We have analyzed the
polar case of perfect network selection (   = 1) in the base model. In section 7 we
have presented the other extreme of no control (   = 0:5), meaning that each foreign
network hosts a travelling subscriber equally likely. As in section 7, operators cannot
discriminate on the retail market according to which foreign network is used abroad.
For clarity, we present the results from the viewpoint of operators with home network
in country A. When buying roaming calls from foreign MNOs on the wholesale market,
operator Ai may decide to buy proportion Ai from operator B0 and proportion 1 Ai
from operator B1. Operator Ai’s perceived marginal costs are:
cAi = AiaB0 + (1   Ai)aB1 (33)
Since operators cannot discriminate the retail prices according to which host network
provides the roaming services, the per call price equals the perceived marginal costs:
62Note that if only one operator in A and Bj declares to form an alliance, Bi strictly prefers to stay
alone as only one alliance can be created and R(c;a(c)) > (a(c);c).
63This speci￿cation is equivalent to the following assumption: Operators can direct their subscribers
to the desired foreign network only with probability ~  2 [0;1]. The remaining subscribers are assigned
randomly to the host networks. Then one immediatly sees that  = ~  + 1
2(1  ~ ) = 1
2 (1 + ~ ). See also
Salsas and Koboldt (2004), section 3.5 for a slightly di￿erent assumption.
37p
Ai = cAi: The equilibrium net surplus, market shares and the retail equilibrium pro￿ts
remain as established in Lemma 1.
We now turn to the wholesale market.
No international alliances. As discussed in sections 3 and 4, operators prefer to





  if aB0 < aB1
1     if aB0 > aB1
We de￿ne the optimized perceived marginal cost of operator Ai as the cheapest




(aB0;aB1)    minfaB0;aB1g + (1    )maxfaB0;aB1g
The main implication of imperfect host network selection is that operators may gen-
erate positive demand even when not o￿ering the cheapest wholesale price. We assume
for simplicity that foreign operators divide the tra￿c evenly among both domestic net-
works if these o￿er equal wholesale prices. Using the results of the retail equilibrium,
in absence of alliances the total wholesale demand of operator Ai(where the superscript








 q ((1    )aAj +  aAi) if aAi < aAj
1
2q(aAi) if aAi = aAj
(1    )q ((1    )aAi +  aAj) if aAi > aAj
Note that the demand is independent of the actual market share of the reselling
operators, since for all price combinations, both foreign operators purchase the same
part of their tra￿c at operator Ai.





R(cAi;cAj) + (aAi   c)Q
NA(aAi;aAj)
Similar to section 4, in equilibrium each operator takes the foreign wholesale prices
and therefore its retail pro￿ts as given. Therefore operator Ai sets its wholesale price
in order to maximize its wholesale pro￿t (aAi   c)QNA(aAi;aAj). Under the technical
assumption 3 of section 7, no pure strategy equilibrium obtains for   2 (0:5;1):
Lemma 17 Suppose that assumption 3 holds. For   2 (0:5;1), there is no pure strategy
equilibrium.




A0 = c, then increasing the own price increases wholesale pro￿ts. If
a
A0 > c, then undercutting slightly increases pro￿ts.
We now show that there is no asymmetric equilibrium. Let p denote the maxi-
mizer of (p   c)q(p).64 Suppose to the contrary w.l.o.g. that a
A0 6= a
A1. Then there
exists an operator Ai such that a
Ai 6= p. But then there exists an ^ aAi such that
64Which exists by assumption 3.
38sign(^ aAi aAj) = sign(a
Ai aAj) and j^ aAi   pj < ja
Ai   pj. By assumption 3, this im-




Aj) and therefore contradicts
equilibrium.
By symmetry and the usual Bertrand reasoning, there cannot exist an equilibrium in
which both operators set di￿erent wholesale prices. However, under imperfect network
selection the fully competitive equilibrium of section 4 vanishes and there is no other
equilibrium in which both operators set higher wholesale prices. Intuitively, there is no
equilibrium with a
A0 = a
A1 = c because deviating upwards generates strictly positive
wholesale pro￿ts.
Two international alliances. Similar to section 5, we now analyze the equilibrium
outcome after operators with same location have formed two competing alliances. We
omit the country index for brevity.
We maintain all assumptions of the base model but assume that each member can
at most commit that a proportion   of its subscribers uses the foreign partner network
to place roaming calls. Furthermore, we restrict operators to sell roaming calls on the
wholesale market to all foreign operators for the same price ai that is negotiated within
an alliance.
If both alliances have negotiated the wholesale prices ai and aj, the equilibrium
wholesale demand for roaming calls of operator i is
Qi = Q(ai;aj)   n

iq ( ai + (1    )aj) + (1    )(1   n











[v ( ai + (1    )aj)   v ( aj + (1    )ai)]
is the equilibrium retail market share. The pro￿t of each operator in alliance i is:
i = (ai;aj)  
R(ci;cj) + (ai   c)[ n

iq (ci) + (1    )(1   n

i)q (cj)] (34)
If both ￿rms realize a strictly positive market share, the marginal pro￿t with respect
to the own wholesale price is:
@
@ai


















(ci) + (1    )














((1    )q(cj)    q(ci))
Considering a symmetric equilibrium with a
i = a
j = a and therefore c
i = c
j = a
as well as n
i = 1




3 (2    1)
 
 2 + (1    )
2
q(a) + (2    1)
2 n(a)
 (36)
where q() is the price elasticity of the per customer demand and n(a)  2
3aq(a)
is the price elasticity of the retail market share for aj = ai = a in case of perfect tra￿c
direction.65
Comparing (36) with the equilibrium characterization (14) of the base model reveals
that for the same wholesale price ai, the right hand side of (36) is always larger than
that of (14) since 1   2
3 (2    1)  1
3,  2 + (1    )
2  1 and (2    1)  1 hold. These
observations allow to establish that imperfect tra￿c steering leads to higher equilibrium
wholesale prices:
Proposition 18 Suppose that assumption 2 holds. Then the equilibrium wholesale
price a in any symmetric equilibrium is decreasing in the quality of the tra￿c steering
technology ( ).
Proof.
Using (35) with ai = aj and
dn
i
dai jai=aj = 











2 + (1    )
2
= 0
As the the middle term is strictly negative for   > 0:5 and 0 for   = 0:5, it follows
that (a)
 
 2 + (1    )
2




2[1 + 2q(a)(a   c)] + 2(a)(2    1)
















Clearly, the denominator of the right hand side is strictly negative since 1 
 




0(a)  0 by assumption 2. The the numerator is strictly positive. Taken to-
gether da
d  < 0.
Intuitively, there are two channels that cause a higher equilibrium price when net-
work selection is imperfect (  < 1). Firstly, compared to the base model (   = 1), the
retail market share is less sensitive to increases of the wholesale price. This is because
the perceived marginal costs ci of operators within alliance i depend less on the own
wholesale price ai while the perceived marginal costs of operators of the rival alliance
j depend partly on ai. Secondly, under imperfect tra￿c direction, operators of alliance
j have to procure a proportion 1     of their subscribers’ roaming calls from alliance
i. When selling to non-alliance operators, the alliance does not take lower retail prof-
its that are implied by a higher wholesale price into account, which renders a high
wholesale price more attractive.
65Both q() and n(a) are de￿ned as in section 5.
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